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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE PREAPPOINTMENT EXPERIENCE
Benjamin H. Barton
This Article compares the years of experience that preceded each
Justice‘s appointment to the United States Supreme Court. This Article
seeks to demonstrate that the background experiences of the Roberts
Court Justices are quite different from those of earlier Supreme Court
Justices and to persuade the reader that this is harmful. To determine
how the current Justices compare to their historical peers, the study
gathered a database that considers the yearly pre-Court experience for
every Supreme Court Justice from John Jay to Elena Kagan. The results
are telling: the Roberts Court Justices have spent more pre-appointment
time in legal academia, appellate judging, and living in Washington,
D.C., than any previous Supreme Court Justices. They also spent the
most time in elite undergraduate and law school settings. Time spent in
these pursuits has naturally meant less time spent elsewhere; the
Roberts Court Justices have spent less time in the private practice of
law, in trial judging, and as elected politicians than any previous Court.
Having demonstrated that the Roberts Justices are outliers across
multiple studied experiences, this Article argues that the change is
regrettable for multiple normative reasons.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article compares the years of experience that preceded each
Justice‘s appointment to the United States Supreme Court. This Article
seeks to demonstrate that the background experiences of the Roberts
Court Justices are quite different from those of earlier Supreme Court
Justices and to persuade the reader that this is harmful.
The first proposition is an empirical one, and the difference in the
Justices‘ backgrounds is demonstrable. To determine how the current
Justices compare to their historical peers, the study gathered a massive
database that considers the yearly pre-Court experience for every
Supreme Court Justice from John Jay to Elena Kagan. The results are
startling and telling: the Roberts Court Justices have spent more preappointment time in legal academia, appellate judging, and living in
Washington, D.C., than any previous Supreme Court. They also spent
the most time in elite undergraduate and law school settings.1 Time
spent in these pursuits has naturally meant less time spent elsewhere;
1. The study treats the Ivy League universities and Stanford University as ―elite
institutions.‖
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the Roberts Court Justices have spent less time in the private practice of
law, in trial judging, and as elected politicians than any previous Court.
Having demonstrated that the Roberts Justices are outliers across
multiple studied experiences, this Article argues that the change is
regrettable for multiple normative reasons. First, the current Justices
have been chosen largely on the basis of academic and professional
achievements evincing technical excellence in legal reasoning and
writing. These strengths are weaknesses in an era where the Court‘s
opinions are growing longer,2 more splintered,3 and ever more
complex.4
Second, the Supreme Court is the leading player in the drafting,
amending, and interpretation of the various federal rules,5 and these
Justices have less courtroom experience (as lawyers or trial judges) than
prior Justices.
Lastly, these Justices have a great deal of experience in cloistered
and detached jobs like appellate judging or teaching law and only
limited experience in jobs that require more interaction with the public
and litigants, like trial judging, practicing law, or running for office.
These cloistered and detached experiences offer limited opportunities
for the development of the most critical judicial virtue: practical
wisdom.6
There has been a spate of recent commentary on the preappointment experiences of the Justices on the Roberts Court. Some
have argued that the current Supreme Court Justices are overly similar.
They all went to Harvard or Yale Law School,7 and excluding Justice
2. See Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S.
Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 634–38 (2008) (demonstrating empirically the
growth in opinion length over the history of the Court).
3. See Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the ―Respectful‖ Dissent,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1317–26 (2011) (discussing the growth in the dissenting opinion and
the word ―respectfully‖); see also James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality
Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 519 (2011) (―Historically, plurality decisions by the Supreme
Court have been relatively rare . . . the frequency of plurality opinions dramatically increased in
the 1940s and 1950s, the occurrence of plurality opinions between 1953 and 2006 has remained
fairly steady, with a moderate increase during the 1970s when Warren Burger served as Chief
Justice.‖).
4. See Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal
Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 126–27 (1998) (finding increased complexity and
obfuscation in U.S. Supreme Court federal jurisdiction opinions). Consider Judge Richard
Posner‘s classic critique from Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2007): ―The
multiplication of rules and standards, carrying in its train as it does endless debate over
boundaries, is one of the banes of the American legal system, a source of its appalling
complexity.‖
5. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1100–04 (2002).
6. See infra Subsection III.C.4.
7. See Patrick J. Glen, Harvard and Yale Ascendant: The Legal Education of the Justices
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Elena Kagan, they are all former judges on federal circuit courts of
appeals.8 Furthermore, they represent limited geographical diversity.9
Others have expressed concern that none of the current Justices have
been politicians.10 Piecing these critiques together, there is a concern
that the experiences of the Roberts Court Justices are quite distinct from
past Justices and that these differences are deleterious.11
Nevertheless, this study is the first to take a broad view of all of
these factors. The question of whether the backgrounds of the current
Justices are substantially different from past Justices is an empirical
one, and this study attempts to determine the accuracy of these
criticisms. The study collects and analyzes the annual pre-appointment
experiences of every Justice and every sitting Supreme Court from the
first to the latest. The study is the first to take a broad and
comprehensive look at the annual experiences of the Justices of the
Court across multiple criteria (geography, education, and work are all
considered).12 Counting years offers a more nuanced and accurate
picture of exactly what Justices have done, when, and for how long, and
allows for clearer direct comparisons among different Supreme Courts.
From Holmes to Kagan, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 129, 130–31 (2010) (arguing against the
dominance of Harvard and Yale on the current Court). But see Christopher Edley, Jr., Why
Elites Do Belong on the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, May 16, 2010, at B01 (arguing the
opposite).
8. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and its Consequences
for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 906 (2003); Tracey E.
George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1333, 1335 (2008).
9. See Tim Padgett, Is the Supreme Court Too Packed With Ivy Leaguers?, TIME, May
12, 2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1988877,00.html (stating
that ―the [C]ourt today has ‗less geographical diversity than it did even when Thomas Jefferson
was President‘‖).
10. See Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone, The Case for Returning Politicians to the
Supreme Court, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1354–58 (2010).
11. There is a similar concern that the Roberts Court Justices‘ life experiences (outside of
race and gender) are less diverse than previous Courts. For a pre-Justice Kagan version of this
argument, see Timothy P. O‘Neill, ―The Stepford Justices‖: The Need for Experiential Diversity
on the Roberts Court, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 702 (2007). In a related study, Benjamin H. Barton
& Emily Moran, Measuring Diversity on the Supreme Court with Biodiversity Statistics, __ J.
EMP. L. STUD. __ (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), we use biodiversity
statistics to prove that the Roberts Court is at least as diverse as prior Supreme Courts in terms
of life experiences. Note that this is not inconsistent with a finding that the Roberts Court
Justices‘ experiences are different from those of prior Justices. Those experiences can be equally
diverse, but still different than prior Courts.
12. Previous studies have generally relied upon a more binary assessment of experiences,
that is, whether a Justice has or has not had a particular experience. See, e.g., Glen, supra note 7,
at 131–37 (employing binary analysis of law school education); see also Epstein et al., supra
note 8, at 913–37 & figs.1–10 (employing binary analysis of various factors except for
comparisons of positions held by Justices when they were appointed and the mean number of
years a Justice worked in private practice before appointment).
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The data set considers a large number of factors, including the years
each Justice spent in which geographic locations; where and if a Justice
went to law school; what, if any, undergraduate institution a Justice
attended;13 whether a Justice worked in private practice, separating out
practice as a solo practitioner, practice as a partner in a small group of
lawyers, and practice as part of larger law firms; whether each Justice
had ever been elected to office (and how long the Justice served in
office), separating out executive from legislative elections, as well as
federal from state; how long each Justice served in a presidential
cabinet, taught in a law school, served in the military, ran a non-law
business, served as a trial or appellate judge in either the state or federal
judiciary, clerked for a judge or Justice, or served as the Solicitor
General or Attorney General of the United States. In sum, the study
attempts to account for every year of each Justice‘s pre-appointment life
to track the experiences that the Justices brought with them to the
Supreme Court over time.
The study reaches some surprising conclusions and offers strong
evidence that the latest Roberts Court is a relative outlier in comparison
to past Supreme Courts. The data suggest that many of the criticisms of
the current Justices‘ backgrounds are well-grounded and that, as a
whole, the experiences of the Roberts Court represent a substantial
departure from previous Supreme Courts.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines how the study was
designed and implemented; Part II details the findings; and Part III
discusses some of the ramifications of Part II‘s findings and suggests a
return to prior selection criteria.
I. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This study details experiences that preceded each Justice‘s
appointment to the United States Supreme Court. The study attempts to
measure these experiences as broadly and as comprehensively as
possible; thus, educational, geographical, and professional experiences
are all tracked by years.
There are therefore two assumptions underlying the study—(1) that
the experiences of the Justices will have an effect on their decision
making and (2) that measuring these experiences in terms of time is
more useful than counting experiences in a binary fashion by simply
noting whether any Justice has, or has not, had a particular experience.
The first assumption is intuitively obvious and empirically
defensible. Since at least the 1960s, political scientists and others have
13. Because the study includes all U.S. Supreme Court Justices, there are many from the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries who ―read law‖ and did not attend law school. There are also
a few who were appointed with no formal education whatsoever.
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postulated that the backgrounds and experiences of Supreme Court
Justices affect their decision making.14 Although some empirical studies
of Justices‘ backgrounds have failed to find an effect,15 there are
sufficient studies demonstrating an effect to offer empirical support to
the intuition that background must affect decision making.16 In
particular, a series of studies have found that certain occupational
experiences—like working in academia,17 as a prosecutor,18 as a
judge,19 or as a politician20—do have an effect on Supreme Court
14. See, e.g., STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE
(1969) (bringing together a group of studies that examined the role that personal background
plays in legal decision making); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946–1963 (1965) (applying psychological studies of
human behavior to Supreme Court decision making).
15. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1463–65 (1998) (finding no
relationship between elite law school education and district judges‘ decisions on the
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models
of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and
Economics Decisions, 1946–1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 359–63 (1981) (failing to find a
relationship between college prestige and civil rights and liberties liberalism).
16. For an outstanding overview of these studies, see George, supra note 8, at 1349–55.
17. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 14 (2001) (demonstrating
that academic experience was not a proxy for a particular policy preference but that it was
associated with greater activism on the bench).
18. See, e.g., Richard E. Johnston, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: A Comparison of the
Warren and Burger Courts, in CASES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 84 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1976)
(demonstrating that Justices with prosecutorial experience were more pro-prosecution in civil
rights cases); Tate, supra note 15, at 359–63 (showing that Justices without prosecutorial
experience favored civil liberties claims). For a few non-Supreme Court studies, see Stuart S.
Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
333, 335–36 (1962) (finding that former prosecutors on state supreme courts were proprosecution in criminal cases); Stuart S. Nagel, Multiple Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds
and Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 258, 266 (1974) (showing small pro-prosecution effect for
former prosecutor judges).
19. For a recent example of a study showing the effect of prior judicial experience on
Justice decision-making, see Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal
Judicial Experience Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2009). Other studies
considering the effect of prior judicial experience are a bit of a mixed bag. Compare Tate, supra
note 15, at 362 (considering the period 1946 through 1978 and concluding that Justices with
prior judicial experience were more receptive to civil rights and liberties claims regardless of
their party identification, other experiences, or personal attributes), with Johnston, supra note
18, at 87–89 & tbl.3 (showing the opposite correlation, that Justices with prior judicial
experience tended to be conservative on civil liberties), and C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg,
Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting
Behavior, 1916–88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460, 473–76 (1991) (stating that between 1916 and
1988, prior judicial experience showed no effect on civil rights and liberties decisions and a
weak relationship to economic rulings).
20. See, e.g., James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying
the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1681 (1999)
(noting that former politician judges were more likely to support labor unions); Sheldon
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decision making.
The second assumption is harder to intuit, especially because a
purely annual count must ignore other important questions of diversity
and experience—like religion, ethnicity, and family background—as
those experiences tend to be lifelong and not reducible to a firm set of
years.21 These diversity elements were studied, however, and will be
mentioned, but they cannot be easily compared against the other,
annualized factors. Nevertheless, the advantage of using years is that it
allows for weighting by time, treating Justice Louis Brandeis‘s thirtynine years of private practice differently from Justice Elena Kagan‘s
two years.
The study was built from multiple different source materials, but the
basic structure was as follows. The first source considered was The
Biographical Directory of the Federal Judiciary,22 which contains brief
biographical sketches of every federal judge since 1789, and gives short
descriptions of their careers, helpfully listed by years. The study
checked this data against an exceptional online database of information
about every Supreme Court nominee (including those who were not
confirmed) compiled by Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt,
Scott Hendrickson, and Jason Roberts.23 In cases where there were
discrepancies between the two sources, or neither source answered a
question (such as which years a Justice spent in which localities as a
child), other sources were considered, most notably Leon Friedman and
Fred L. Israel‘s four-volume biography of the Justices, The Justices of
the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions.24
Despite (or perhaps because of) these multiple sources, some
discrepancies were inevitable, especially when measuring years.
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 491, 501–02 & tbl.8 (1975) (finding that judges with political experience tended to
disfavor the government in fiscal cases); Tate, supra note 15, at 363 (showing that politician
Justices were more liberal on economic questions).
21. The alternative was to assign a number of years of being a woman before becoming a
Supreme Court Justice to Ruth Bader Ginsburg or to assign a number of years to growing up in
rural poverty to the twenty-seventh Justice, John Catron. See Frank Otto Gatell, John Catron, in
1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 372
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) [hereinafter JUSTICES].
22. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: 1789–2000 (Bernan Editorial
Staff ed., 2001) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY].
23. LEE EPSTEIN, THOMAS G. WALKER, NANCY STAUDT, SCOTT HENDRICKSON & JASON
ROBERTS, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES DATABASE (2010), available at
http://epstein.law.n
orthwestern.edu/research/justicesdata.html [hereinafter DATABASE]. The study also worked from
a less comprehensive print version of similar data. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J.
SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
24. JUSTICES, supra note 21.
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Justices, especially Justices from the nineteenth century, frequently had
two jobs at once, making coding based on time challenging. It was quite
common for lawyer–politicians in the nineteenth century to practice law
while serving as a government official. For example, the second Justice,
John Rutledge, practiced law and served as a member of the South
Carolina House of Commons for thirteen years.25
Likewise, teaching law often overlapped with private practice.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is a recent example, as she worked as
counsel for the ACLU‘s Women‘s Rights Project while she was a law
professor at Columbia.26 Surprisingly, two different Supreme Court
Justices—Justice Horace Lurton and Chief Justice William Howard
Taft—served as deans of a law schools while holding other presumably
time-consuming jobs as Circuit Judges on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.27 Under these circumstances, the study
coded both employments for the full number of years, rather than
dividing the years or assigning primacy to one of the simultaneous
jobs.28
These sources were boiled down into a short biographical sketch of
each Justice divided by years. These years were then divided into
studied categories and subcategories as follows:
1. The Private Practice of Law—Separately lists the years each
Justice worked in solo practice, as part of a small partnership, in
a larger law firm, or as an in-house corporate or organization
lawyer.29 These categories are then combined into a single
measure of the length of private practice.
2. Government Lawyer—Separately lists the years each Justice
worked as a prosecutor, an Assistant Solicitor General, Solicitor
General, United States Attorney General, United States Attorney
for a district, an attorney general of a state, or other
miscellaneous government lawyer work. These categories are

25. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 23, at 278, 291.
26. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Second Woman Justice: Ruth Bader Ginsburg Talks
Candidly About a Changing Society, 1993 A.B.A. J. 40 (1993); Peter J. Rubin, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg: A Judge’s Perspective, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 825 (2009).
27. See James F. Watts, Jr., Horace H. Lurton, in 3 JUSTICES, supra note 21, at 934–35;
Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft, in 3 JUSTICES, supra note 21, at 1053.
28. This option was chosen because it involved the least amount of judgment in terms of
coding and thus was least likely to inject any bias. That said, readers should remember when
reading the results of this study that earlier Justices were more likely to work two jobs at once.
29. These categories of practice come from LEE EPSTEIN, THOMAS G. WALKER, NANCY
STAUDT, SCOTT A. HENDRICKSON & JASON M. ROBERTS, CODEBOOK: U.S. SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES DATABASE 45 (2010), available at http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.pdf.
There is occasional overlap and confusion between the small partnership and law firm
categories, and the exact dates of work, especially for the earlier Justices, can be fuzzy. See id.
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combined into a single measure of years spent as a government
lawyer.
Elected Official—Separately lists the years each Justice spent as
the President of the United States, United States Senator, United
States Representative, member of the Continental Congress,
governor, state legislator, mayor, or some other locally elected
position.30 These categories are combined into a single measure
of years spent as an elected official.
Law Teaching—Separately lists the years each Justice spent as a
law school instructor, professor, or dean. These categories are
combined into a single measure of years spent teaching law.
Prior Judicial Experience—Separately lists the years each
Justice spent as a federal appellate judge, federal trial judge,
state appellate judge, or state trial judge. These categories are
combined into three different aggregate measures: total time
spent judging, total time spent appellate judging, and total time
spent trial judging.
Non-Law Government Service—Separately lists the years each
Justice spent in non-law-related government service for local
governments, state governments, and the federal government.
Time spent as the head of a cabinet level agency other than the
Justice Department in the federal government is separately
counted from other federal service. These categories are
combined into a single measure of non-law government service.
Additional Employment Categories—The study also lists the
years each Justice spent in the military, working in a private,
non-law capacity, and any years spent as a law clerk to a federal
judge, a state supreme court justice, or United States Supreme
Court Justice.
Geography—Separately lists each geographic location (either a
state or a foreign country) where a Justice lived from birth until
appointment to the Supreme Court. For purposes of adulthood, a
Justice‘s geographic location is defined by where they worked
rather than where they lived.31 These locations are then grouped

30. One of my favorite unusual job experiences is Justice Lewis Powell‘s nine years as the
Chairman of the Richmond Public School Board in Richmond, Virginia. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES,
JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 160–66 (1994).
31. The study codes in this manner because the employment data is readily available,
whereas the actual domiciliary data is often unavailable. This adjustment matters most for
Justices who worked in Washington, D.C., which is always coded as D.C., rather than
attempting to determine if the person actually lived in Maryland, Virginia, or both while
working in D.C. Insofar as the geographic listing is meant to reflect experiences, it would be
strange to code Justice Lewis Powell‘s years in Richmond, Virginia, the same as a Justice who
lived in a Virginia suburb while serving as a judge on the D.C. Circuit, so this coding decision is
defensible as a matter of both feasibility and accuracy.
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into eight categories:32 New England,33 Mid-Atlantic,34 South,35
Midwest,36 Southwest,37 West,38 Abroad (foreign countries),39
and Washington, D.C.40
9. Education—Separately lists the years each Justice spent in
undergraduate or graduate education. There are separate
categories for total undergraduate years and the years each
Justice spent in undergraduate education at Yale, Harvard,
Princeton, another Ivy League institution, or Stanford.41 There
are also separate categories for total years in law school, years in
law school at Yale or Harvard, years spent at another Ivy League
law school or Stanford, years spent in a masters program, years
spent studying in a foreign country, and years spent ―reading
law.‖42
The study assigns a year value (either zero or a whole number) to
each of these categories for each Justice. One hundred fourteen Justices
were listed, rather than 112, because Chief Justices Rutledge and
32. These categories come from The Regions of the United States, U.S. DIPLOMATIC
MISSION TO GERMANY, http://usa.usembassy.de/travel-regions.htm (last visited June 6, 2012).
33. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See
id.
34. Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. See id. But see infra
note 40 explaining the coding for Washington, D.C.
35. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. See id.
36. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. See id.
37. Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. See id.
38. Alaska, Colorado, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. See id.
39. The foreign countries where Justices spent one year or longer, listed alphabetically,
are: Austria, England, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Philippines, Russia,
Scotland, Spain, and Turkey. The study codes the Philippines as a foreign location, although it
was a U.S. protectorate during the time at issue.
40. Washington, D.C., is coded separately, rather than grouped in the Mid-Atlantic region
because the large number of years in D.C. would skew the Mid-Atlantic numbers and because
the years spent in D.C. are also of interest as a proxy for time spent in and around the seat of the
federal government.
41. Princeton, Yale, and Harvard are listed together as the three most elite American
universities historically. See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 17–23 (2005). The other Ivy
League schools are Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, and the University of Pennsylvania.
See generally DANIEL CAPPELLO, THE IVY LEAGUE (2012). Stanford is included in this list
because in the second half of the twentieth century it rose to equal prominence. See JONATHAN
R. COLE, THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: ITS RISE TO PREEMINENCE, ITS INDISPENSIBLE
NATIONAL ROLE, WHY IT MUST BE PROTECTED 117–29 (2009).
42. During the nineteenth century, the dominant form of legal education was to ―read law‖
as an apprentice to a lawyer or on one‘s own. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 3–10 (1983).
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Hughes are counted separately from Associate Justices Rutledge and
Hughes. Both Rutledge and Hughes left the Court (and gained new
experiences before they returned), so they are counted separately both
times.43
The study then grouped the Justices into ―natural Supreme Courts,‖
each named sequentially for the Chief Justice.44 Note that these natural
Courts do not have the same number of Justices. The first natural Court
(Jay 1) had only five Supreme Court Justices; all of the Courts from
1790 to 1807 (Jay 2 to Marshall 4) had six or fewer Justices; and the
Courts from 1863 to 1870 (Taney 15 and Chase 1) had ten Justices.45
Further, some of these Courts existed for relatively short periods and
others for much longer. For example, the period without a chief justice
in 1796 following the Senate‘s rejection of Justice Rutledge as Chief
Justice lasted a little over a month,46 while Rehnquist 6 (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O‘Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer) lasted for over eleven years. 47 The
study refers to these Supreme Courts by Chief Justice last name and a
number (for example, Roberts 4). The number refers to the particular
iteration of a Court within a particular Chief Justice‘s tenure. So, the
current Court is called Roberts 4, because Chief Justice Roberts has
presided over three earlier groups of Justices.48
The year values for the individual Justices were then aggregated by
natural Court to create a publicly available Excel spreadsheet to allow
comparisons across Supreme Courts. Thus, the study is able to compare
experience among individual justices as well as among the various
natural Supreme Courts. The four main documents underlying the
43. Justice Rutledge left the Court from 1791–1795 to be the Chief Justice of the South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas. See MATTHEW P. HARRINGTON, JAY AND ELLSWORTH, THE
FIRST COURTS: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 43–45 (2008). Justice Hughes left the Court to
serve as the Republican candidate for president and then went to work in private practice and to
serve as the Secretary of State, among other activities. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES: 1930–1941, 8–12 (2007).
44. These natural Supreme Courts come from COMPENDIUM, supra note 23, at 339–48.
These natural Courts begin when a new Justice takes the oath of office and continue until the
next new Justice takes the oath. When two or more Justices joined the court within a period of
fifteen days or fewer, it counts as a single natural court. See id.
45. See id. at 339–42.
46. See id. at 339. For more on Justice Rutledge‘s failed nomination, see HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 58–59 (5th ed. 2008).
47. See id. at 348.
48. Roberts 1 lasted from September 29, 2005, to January 31, 2006, and consisted of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, O‘Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Roberts 2 replaced O‘Connor with Alito and lasted from January 31,
2006 to August 8, 2009. Roberts 3 replaced Souter with Sotomayor and lasted from August 8,
2009 to August 7, 2010. Roberts 4 started on August 7, 2010, with Kagan replacing Stevens.
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study: the Justices database, the natural Courts database, the key to the
databases, and the narrative version of the Justices‘ experiences are all
posted online for purposes of transparency.49
II. FINDINGS
The study‘s findings are divided by category. In each category,
charts are used to show the prevalence of a particular experience per
Justice. ―Per Justice‖ means that the study divides the total years spent
in any given activity for all of the Justices on any given natural Supreme
Court by the number of Justices on that Court. Because some natural
Courts have had as few as five Justices or as many as ten, a per Justice
measure is generally more accurate than the raw tallies by Court. When
relevant, the study does discuss the cumulative experience of Justices by
natural Court. Taken together, these findings suggest that the
experiences of the Roberts Court Justices are collectively, and
individually, quite distinct from previous Supreme Court Justices‘.
A. The Private Practice of Law
The private practice of law has been the single most prevalent and
lengthy experience of Supreme Court Justices as a whole. One hundred
twelve out of 114 Supreme Court Justices have had at least some private
practice experience. Collectively, those 112 Justices spent 1,898 years
in the practice of law before joining the Court, almost seventeen years
per Justice.50 By comparison, the next most prevalent experience is 671
years as a lower court judge (appellate or district court).
The private practice of law consists of paid work for clients (either
as a solo practitioner or as a member of a small partnership or law firm)
or work for an institutional client, either a corporation or a non-profit
organization.51 The only two Justices in the history of the Court with no
private practice experience are Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel
Alito.52
Before turning to the trends per Justice over time, the general
employment trends are interesting and closely match the overall trend in
49. David Barton, Data Underlying Barton Supreme Court Justices’ Experience Study,
FLORIDALAWREVIEW.COM, http://www.floridalawreview.com.
50. From here forward each of the collective and per Justice figures are derived from the
spreadsheets covering the Justices and the natural Supreme Courts. These spreadsheets are
available online at http://www.floridalawreview.com. The narrative claims, such as that Justice
Roberts worked as an Assistant Solicitor General or Justice Thurgood Marshall worked for the
NAACP, come from the narrative listing of Justice experiences, available online at
http://www.floridalawreview.com.
51. Thus, Justice Ginsburg‘s work for the ACLU and Justice Marshall‘s work for the
NAACP count as private practice, but Justice Alito‘s work as a United States Attorney does not.
52. But both Justices Breyer and Alito did practice law as government lawyers.
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American legal practice from solo practice to small partnerships to
working in larger law firms. The last Supreme Court Justice to have a
solo practice was Thurgood Marshall, and the last to work in a small
partnership was Sandra Day O‘Connor.53 Despite these relatively late
examples, the dominance of the law firm after the 1930s is quite
striking. Figure 1 is a chart showing the years per Justice in four
different practice settings: solo, small partnership, law firm, and
corporate or organizational counsel. One should note that solo practice
is the dominant form at first, followed by small partnership and
eventually by law firm practice. One should also note the shrinkage in
private practice experience as a whole since the mid-1970s.
Figure 1: Private Practice

The cumulative total of years spent in private practice per natural
Supreme Court is remarkable. The most recent Roberts Court (Roberts
4) has a total of fifty-four years in private practice experience, the
absolute lowest number of combined private practice experience of any
Supreme Court, including the five- and six-Justice Supreme Courts of
the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.54
The differences are more marked on a per capita basis. The four
Roberts Courts and Rehnquist 6 are the only Supreme Courts with fewer
53. There is, of course, another reason why these Justices practiced in a less popular and
remunerative setting at the outset of their careers: Most contemporary law firms would not hire
African-Americans or women.
54. The next lowest number is the five-person Court of 1796, which has fifty-eight total
years. The other nine-person Courts with low private practice experience are Roberts 2 with
sixty-seven years, Roberts 3 with seventy-three years, Roberts 1 with seventy-five years, and
Rehnquist 6 with seventy-seven years. Waite 1, 2, and 3 (1874–1881) have three of the four
highest totals, along with Hughes 4 (1937–1938).
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than ten years of private practice per Justice. Charted by time on Figure
2, private practice per Justice shows a marked downward trend during
the Roberts years, with Roberts 4 being the absolute nadir:
Figure 2: Private Practice per Justice

In sum, as a matter of both cumulative experience and per capita time in
private practice, the Roberts Court is a significant departure from
previous Supreme Courts. The average Supreme Court Justice has had
over sixteen years of private practice experience and the average
Roberts 4 Justice has had just six years.
In addition, even the time the Roberts 4 Justices spent in private
practice is of a different kind than the historical norm. All of the
cumulative private practice experience of the current Court came as
corporate counsel or in law firm practice. These practice settings are
distinct from solo and small firm practice in several ways. First, large
law firms tend to represent corporations or businesses rather than
individuals.55 Second, large firm practice is characterized by
specialization.56 Lastly, partially because of the overall trend away from
55. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 961 (2000) (―The largest firms serve almost exclusively
corporate clients. The most successful, influential, and creative lawyers predominantly
(although not exclusively) serve corporate clients. The vast majority of elite law school
graduates end up serving corporate clients.‖).
56. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
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trial work, and partially because of the expense of trial, large firm
lawyers spend much less time in court than their solo and small firm
predecessors.57
Additionally, twenty-one of the collective fifty-four years the study
coded as private practice experience for the Roberts 4 Justices were
spent in particularly rarified and Supreme Court-oriented legal
practices. Chief Justice John Roberts‘s thirteen years at the Washington,
D.C., office of Hogan & Hartson focused largely on appellate work
before the Supreme Court.58 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg‘s eight years
founding and running the ACLU‘s Women‘s Rights Project involved a
constitutional law and Supreme Court practice.59 Thus, this group of
Justices has spent less time in private practice than any other group of
Justices, and much of the time they did spend in private practice tended
to be especially focused on constitutional and Supreme Court matters.
B. Government Lawyer
The study also considered the time each Justice spent as a
government lawyer. Given the dearth of time spent in private practice,
practicing in a government setting is a possible replacement experience.
As Part III argues, the private practice of law offers a particularly
valuable set of experiences, but practice as a government lawyer may
serve some similar purposes. Nevertheless, while the Roberts Courts do
run on the high end for experience as government lawyers, these years
of experience do not fully counterbalance the relative lack of private
practice experience. As demonstrated below, the Roberts Court Justices
are on the very low end of the total amount of time spent practicing law.
Time spent as a lawyer for the government, either federal or state,
has historically been less common than private practice, measured in
terms of total years or by individual Justices. While the Roberts Court
ranks relatively high on this measure (both Roberts 2 with fifty-two
total years and Roberts 4 with forty-nine total years are in the top fifteen
Courts for service as a government lawyer, at eighth and thirteenth,
respectively), the Roberts Courts are not clustered at the very top or
bottom of this scale as they are for private practice (bottom), political
37–38 & fig.2.4 (2005).
57. See Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know about American
Trial Trends, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 35, 36 (2006).
58. See Judicial Nominations: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., THE WHITE HOUSE:
PRESIDENT GEROGE W. BUSH, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/judicialnomi
nees/roberts.html (last visited June 6, 2012). Chief Justice Roberts argued thirty-nine Supreme
Court cases before his appointment to the D.C. Circuit. Id.
59. See Sandra Pullman, Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff,
ACLU (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburgand-wrp-staff.
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experience (bottom), law teaching (top), or judging (top). The 1940s
and 1950s were the high-water mark for time spent as a government
lawyer, with the first Warren Court, serving from 1953 to 1955, topping
the list with seventy-eight total years of experience.60
The trend can be seen in Figure 3‘s graph of the Justices‘ per capita
years spent as government lawyers61:
Figure 3: Government Lawyer

One should note that Roberts Court Justices spent almost the same
amount of years as government lawyers as time spent in private
practice, a significant departure from previous Courts. Figure 4 shows
the two per Justice lines almost converging with Roberts 4.

60. This was still well below the 112 years of total private practice for Warren 1.
61. Note the differences between the scales on the vertical axes of Figure 1 (zero to
twenty-five years per Justice), Figure 2 (zero to thirty years per Justice) and Figure 3 (zero to ten
years per Justice). The scales are different because private practice has been much more
common than service as a government lawyer.
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Figure 4: Government Lawyer

The Roberts 4 Court‘s government lawyering experience, like its
private practice experience, is also weighted towards particularly elite
and Supreme Court-oriented work. The Roberts 4 Court has a total of
forty-nine years spent as a government lawyer. Members of the Court
spent nine of those years in the Solicitor General‘s office, which carries
a completely appellate docket,62 and spent another twelve years in
specialized work for the President or the Senate.63 The balance was
62. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both worked as Assistant U.S. Solicitors
General for four years, and Justice Kagan was the U.S. Solicitor General for one year before
joining the Court. For a description of the history and role of the Office of the Solicitor General,
see REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 1–7 (1992). The
Solicitor General‘s Office was not established until 1870, so obviously no Justices worked there
before that date. Id. at 2–3. Five Justices served as the Solicitor General: Chief Justice William
Howard Taft and Justices Stanley Forman Reed, Robert Jackson, Thurgood Marshall, and Elena
Kagan. See id. at 181–82 app. A. Only two Justices have ever served as Assistant Solicitors
General: Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
63. The government lawyering that fits this description is as follows: Justice Scalia spent
one year as the General Counsel, Office of Telecommunications Policy, Executive Office of the
President; Justice Breyer spent three years serving as an Assistant Special Prosecutor, Watergate
Special Prosecution Force, as a Special Counsel for the Administrative Practices Subcommittee,
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, and as the Chief Counsel for U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee; Chief Justice Roberts spent four years as an Associate Counsel to the President,
White House Counsel‘s Office; Justice Kagan spent four years as a Special Counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, as the Associate Counsel to the President, and as the Deputy
Assistant for Domestic Policy and Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council.
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spent in the more typical U.S. Attorney General‘s office or as a state
prosecutor. Taken with the private practice experience, almost half of
the Roberts 4 Court‘s lawyering experience focused on the Supreme
Court or high-level policy making, not trial practice or traditional
lawyering.
C. Total Practice
Adding the years as a government lawyer with the private practice
years to create a total measure of practice experience shows that the
Roberts Courts do have a historical precedent in the Marshall Courts of
the early nineteenth century. Marshall 7 (1824–1826) is the only Court
with under ten years total practice experience per Justice, with the other
late Marshall Courts showing similar numbers. The current Roberts
Court is the fourth lowest of all time with 11.5 years of total practice
experience per Justice.
A bookended trend towards shorter periods of practicing law in the
first Supreme Courts and the most recent Supreme Courts can be seen in
Figure 5:
Figure 5: Total Practice

D. Elected Official
One of the great surprises from studying the pre-appointment
experiences of Supreme Court Justices is the sheer amount of time prior
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Justices spent as non-lawyer, elected officials.64 The only two categories
that surpass elected office are private practice and judging, counting
trial and appellate experience together. Collectively, Supreme Court
Justices have spent 500 total years as elected officials, more than the
429 years as appellate judges. Given the current Court‘s zero years
spent in elected office and seventy-four years spent on an appellate
bench, it is clear that the Roberts Courts are quite anomalous.
This elected service is impressive for the offices held, the variation
of the offices, and the sheer amount of time for which the offices were
held. Supreme Court Justices have served as President of the United
States, governors of multiple states, and even mayors. Fourteen
different Justices have been U.S. Senators and seventeen have been U.S.
Representatives.
There are only three Supreme Courts on which not a single Justice
has served in an elected office: Roberts 2, Roberts 3, and Roberts 4.65
The trend away from elected office as an experience for Supreme Court
Justices has been marked since the Burger Courts, but has accelerated
recently. The first nineteenth-century Court with relatively limited
elected experience was Waite 6, serving from 1882 to 1886 and
carrying a total of just twelve years of elected experience.
Figure 6 shows how the per Justice years in elected office have
fallen precipitously in recent years:
Figure 6: Elected Official

64. This count does not include time spent as an elected judge or elected attorney general.
Only stints as an elected state or federal legislator or executive are tallied.
65. The retirement of Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor ended a continuous tradition of at
least one former politician on every Supreme Court from Jay 1 forward.
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E. Law Teaching
What the Roberts Courts lack in practice experience, they make up
in law teaching experience. With ninety-five collective years in legal
academia, Roberts 4 is again first among all Supreme Courts in years
spent in legal academia. Interestingly, the gap is not as large as it is in
some other categories; two Courts from the 1940s (Hughes 8 and Stone
2) are just behind with ninety-four total years spent in legal academia.66
Unsurprisingly, given the rarity of law school training in the nineteenth
century, most Supreme Courts during that period have no experience
teaching law.67
Figure 7 shows a long period where no Justices had any experience
teaching, followed by two relative peaks:
Figure 7: Law Teaching

66. Hughes 8 (Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds, Stone, Roberts, Black,
Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy, February 5, 1940–July 3, 1941) and Stone 2 (Chief
Justice Stone and Justices Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, R. Jackson, and
W. Rutledge, February 15, 1943–October 1, 1945) included several Justices with extensive lawteaching experience. Harlan Stone (Professor and Dean at Columbia), Owen Roberts (Professor
at Penn), Felix Frankfurter (Professor at Harvard), William Douglas (Professor at Columbia and
Yale), and Wiley Rutledge (Professor at Colorado and Professor and Dean at Washington
University and Iowa) were all longtime academics. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note
22, at 471, 502, 733, 743, 780. In addition, James McReynolds (Vanderbilt), Charles Evan
Hughes (Cornell and N.Y.U.), and Frank Murphy (University of Detroit) all taught law for a
period of their careers. See id. at 566, 660, 681.
67. This study only measures experience from before joining the Court. As such, the study
does not count Justice Joseph Story‘s long service as an instructor at Harvard while he was a
Justice. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBLIC 237–70 (1985).
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The experience in law teaching helps explain why the Roberts 4 Court
is relatively low in practice or elected experience. Justices Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and
Elana Kagan spent much of their pre-Court careers in academia.
F. Total Judicial Service
Like elected service, before the retirement of Justice O‘Connor,
every Supreme Court has had at least one Justice with some prior
judicial experience. This first measure of judicial service combines any
and all judicial service, including state and federal, as well as trial and
appellate. This experience runs from the least—two total years of
experience for Hughes 6 and 7 (1939–1940)68—to the most—Fuller 5
(1893–1894), with ninety-one total years. Surprisingly, given the
criticism of the current practice of appointing former U.S. circuit court
judges to the Court, the Roberts Court is not at the highest end of prior
judicial service. On this measure, Roberts 3 (eighty-six years total
judicial experience) and Roberts 4 (eighty-one years) are in the top ten,
but the bulk of the top ten and the top three are all from the Fuller
Courts at the turn of the twentieth century.
Figure 8—total judicial experience per Justice—shows that the first
Supreme Court actually had the most prior judicial experience per
Justice:
Figure 8: Total Judicial Service

68. Hughes 6 was Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, Butler,
Stone, Roberts, Black, Reed, and Frankfurter. Hughes 7 subtracted Brandeis and added Douglas.
See COMPENDIUM, supra note 23, at 345. Of these Justices, only Justice Hugo Black had any
judicial experience—two years as a police court judge in Birmingham, Alabama. See HOWARD
BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 5, 13 (1996). The Hughes 6 and 7 Courts, like the
Roberts Courts, were relative outliers in terms of experience.
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The chart shows three different periods where judicial experience
dipped on the Supreme Court, with the early 1940s being a clear low
point. On a per Justice basis, the Roberts Courts are one of three distinct
peaks, yet lower than the highs of Jay 1 and the Fuller Courts.
G. Trial and Appellate Judging Considered Separately
If you disaggregate trial and appellate judicial experience, however,
the Roberts Courts‘ lengthy experience as appellate judges stands out
more clearly. The Roberts Courts are four of the top six in cumulative
total years of appellate judging. Roberts 2 and Roberts 3 are first and
second, with Justices spending eighty and seventy-nine total years as
appellate judges, respectively. In fact, while commentators have noted
the rise of the federal appellate judgeship in the last fifty years, the trend
lines also show the move away from trial court experience. Figure 9
shows both trial and appellate experience:
Figure 9: Trial and Appellate Judging Considered Separately

Trial judge experience has shown a relatively steady decline since the
heights of the early Supreme Courts, while appellate experience has
waxed and waned more significantly.69 The Roberts Courts have the
highest per Justice appellate experience, but the Courts of the early
twentieth century are close behind.

69. Congress did not create the federal courts of appeals until 1891, so all of the pre-1891
appellate experience came from state appellate courts. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891,
ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
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H. State and Federal Judging
If you disaggregate state and federal judging, another unique feature
of the Roberts Courts becomes clear—Roberts 3 and Roberts 4 are the
only two Supreme Courts on which no Justice has spent any time
working as a state court judge. The replacement of Justice David
Hackett Souter with Justice Sonia Sotomayor interrupted an unbroken
string of Courts featuring at least some state court experience.
Figure 10: State and Federal Judging

Figure 10 shows that federal judicial experience and state judicial
experience have essentially traded places from the first Court to the
most recent Court. There was very limited federal court experience
before 1881 and state court experience was generally more common
until the 1960s, when federal court experience significantly outstripped
state court experience for the first time.
I. Miscellaneous Employment Categories
The five categories considered above are the five biggest sources of
pre-Court professional experience, but there are three additional, less
prevalent categories worth mentioning: non-law government service,
military service, and non-law private employment.
1. Non-Law Government Service
Many Supreme Court Justices have some experience as government
employees in jobs that do not involve much, if any, legal practice. This
study coded various levels of jobs from undersecretaries to cabinet-level
positions as non-law government service. For example, across eleven
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years Justice Clarence Thomas worked as a legislative assistant to then
U.S. Senator John Danforth, as the assistant secretary for civil rights at
the Department of Education, and then as the chairman of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.70 Each of these experiences
counts as non-law government service because these jobs (unlike
working as an Assistant U.S. Attorney or in the White House Counsel‘s
Office) do not require a law degree.
Non-law government service was less common historically. The
Roberts 4 Court is above the median, but still in the middle, with
fourteen cumulative years and approximately one and a half years per
Justice. Figure 11 shows that this experience ran high for the first fifty
or so years of the Supreme Court71 and has remained relatively lower
ever since:
Figure 11: Non-Law Government Service

2. Military Service
The amount of military service experience of various Supreme
Courts tends to rise and fall depending on when wars were fought and
the level of participation in those wars. For example, most Justices who
were of fighting age during the Revolutionary War and World War II
appear to have fought, as shown by the spike in judicial military
experience following those wars, while the veterans of other wars were
70. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 801.
71. The absolute peak of seven and a half years of non-law government service per Justice
was Marshall 5 (1811–1812).
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less prevalent on the Court.72
Figure 12: Military Service per Justice

Roberts 4 has relatively little military experience (Justices Breyer and
Kennedy each have one year of experience), but there are several Courts
with no military experience, including Jay 1 from 1789, the three Courts
from 1870 to 1874 (Chase 2, Chase 3, and Waite 1), and Hughes 3 from
1932 to 1937.
3. Private Enterprise
While it is a relatively rare category of experience, there are twelve
Justices who worked in a private, non-law enterprise for some period of
time before joining the Court. This experience varies quite widely, from
Justice James Wilson‘s ten years as a businessman and land speculator
in Philadelphia to Justice Byron White‘s years as a professional football
player for the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Detroit Lions. 73 Five Justices
ran nineteenth and early twentieth century newspapers.74 Justice Lucius
72. In reading Figure 12, please note the difference in scale on the vertical axis. The bulk
of the previous charts have run from zero to ten years per Justice, and this Figure spans zero to
three years per Justice.
73. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 841, 848.
74. Justice John McLean was the founder and editor of The Western Star, a Lebanon,
Ohio newspaper from 1807 to 1812. John McLean and The Western Star,
HISTORICLEBANONOHIO (May 17, 2009, 6:52PM), http://www.historiclebanonohio.com/?q=mcl
ean. The Western Star is still in publication. See THE WESTERN STAR, http://www.westernstar.com (last visited June 6, 2012). Justice Henry Baldwin was the publisher of The Tree of
Liberty, a Republican newspaper in Pittsburgh. See TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 83 (2001). The Tree of Liberty is no longer in
publication, although a spurious newspaper based on the video game Grand Theft Auto entitled
―Liberty Tree‖ was created in 2001. See LIBERTY TREE, http://www.rockstargames.com/libertytr
ee (last visited June 6, 2012). Justice Stanley Matthews was the editor of the Tennessee
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Q.C. Lamar was the President of the University of Mississippi and
Justice Joseph Lamar was a professor of Latin at Bethany College. The
twelve Justices with non-law experience were spread out over time, so
that more than half of all the historical Supreme Courts have had at least
one Justice with some such experience. No Justice has had any private,
non-law experience since Justice Byron White‘s retirement in 1993.
J. Geography
The study measures the years each Supreme Court Justice spent in
any state or foreign country.75 For ease of use, the study aggregates the
states into different geographic areas of the country and a category for
foreign countries.76 Without aggregating the data, there are some
interesting trends.
Each nomination by the President to the Senate has included an
official home state for the nominee,77 and these alone show some
noteworthy results. Unsurprisingly, given the historical context, the two
most prevalent official home states are New York and Massachusetts.
New York‘s overall lead is somewhat surprising, however. Out of 114
Justices considered, sixteen listed New York as their home state.
Massachusetts is second with ten Justices—a substantial gap that
reflects New York‘s dominance as the historic legal and commercial
center of the United States.78

Democrat in Maury County, Tennessee. See D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE WAITE COURT:
JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 123 (2003). Chief Justice Melville Fuller was the editor of the
Augusta Age in Augusta, Maine. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W.
FULLER: 1888–1910 5 (1995). Justice James Byrnes edited the Aiken Journal and Review in
Aiken, South Carolina. See ROBERT SOBEL, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1774–1989 54 (1990).
75. Only full years of experience are counted and for some of the Justices the years of
their childhood are somewhat fuzzy. For example, Justice John McLean‘s childhood years were
split between New Jersey, Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio without any clear record of when he
lived in each state. See TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE TANEY COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND
LEGACY 51 (2003).
76. The categories are New England, Mid-Atlantic, South, Midwest, Southwest, West,
foreign countries, and Washington, D.C. See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text.
77. See DATABASE, supra note 23, at 93.
78. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 80 (1994) (stating that following the opening of the Erie Canal in
1825 and into the late nineteenth century, New York City was ―the dominant force in American
economic life‖ and ―a center for legal work‖); MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO
PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 17
(1988) (―Though New York was not the only city in which large law firms emerged around the
turn of the [twentieth] century, it did have the greatest concentration of them, reflecting its
position as the nation‘s financial and commercial center.‖).
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The rest of the top ten includes some surprises. Ohio has nine
Justices; Virginia has eight. Pennsylvania and Tennessee have six each,
and Kentucky, Maryland, and New Jersey have five each. Virginia‘s
standing as the fourth state for producing Supreme Court Justices,
behind Ohio, is rather surprising,79 given Virginia‘s relative political
and economic dominance post-Revolution and into the early nineteenth
century and Ohio‘s comparative stature as a frontier during that time
period.80 Tennessee and Kentucky were also relative frontier states in
the first half of the nineteenth century,81 so their representation on the
Court seems improbable, especially in comparison to the relative
paucity of Justices from the non-Virginia original southern states—
North Carolina (two), South Carolina (three), and Georgia (four). Two
other original states, Delaware and Rhode Island, have never produced a
Justice. Other surprisingly underrepresented states include Texas with
one Justice, and Florida, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin
with none.82
Tallied by years, these geographic trends are more pronounced
because many Justices who have not claimed New York or
Massachusetts as their home state for nomination purposes have spent a
chunk of time in those states for work or education.83 The Justices have
spent a total of 793 years in the State of New York and 522 years in
Massachusetts, the two highest numbers.84 The next longest stay in any
single jurisdiction is Washington, D.C., with 468 collective years. No
Justice was born or raised in Washington, D.C., so that collective time
all results from time spent working in the federal government, generally
79. Of course, students of presidential history will note that Ohio and Virginia have a
spirited debate over which state has been the ―home‖ state to more U.S. Presidents as well. See
‗Home’ to More Presidents: Ohio or Va.?, FACTCHECK.ORG (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.factche
ck.org/2008/02/home-to-more-presidents-ohio-or-virginia. So maybe Ohio has punched above
its weight in two of the three branches.
80. Compare KEVIN R.C. GUTZMAN, VIRGINIA‘S AMERICAN REVOLUTION: FROM
DOMINION TO REPUBLIC, 1776–1840 163–97 (2007) (describing Virginia‘s fall from political and
economic dominance in the early nineteenth century), with R. DOUGLAS HURT, THE OHIO
FRONTIER: CRUCIBLE OF THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1720–1830 (1998) (discussing the frontier period
of Ohio history).
81. For a history of Tennessee‘s frontier period, see generally JOHN R. FINGER, TENNESSEE
FRONTIERS: THREE REGIONS IN TRANSITION (2001). For Kentucky, see generally OTIS K. RICE,
FRONTIER KENTUCKY (1993).
82. The other states with no Justices are less surprising: Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West
Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
83. Harvard, Yale, and Princeton are a relative boon to Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
New Jersey.
84. From 1789 to the present, every Court but six (the six Courts from 1795 to 1807) has
had at least one Justice who has spent a year or more in New York. Likewise, only Marshall 5
(November 23, 1811 to February 3, 1812) and five of the later Taney Courts from 1845 to 1862
did not include any Justices who had lived in Massachusetts.
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as a politician, a lawyer, or a judge.
The Justices have spent the most time in the Mid-Atlantic,85 with the
South a close second.86 Adding regions together suggests the dominance
of the Northeast and the East Coast in the lives of the Justices. If we
aggregate to create a Northeast measure (a combination of New
England, the Mid-Atlantic, and Washington, D.C.), the Justices have
spent almost half of their collective lives in that region. If we aggregate
the East Coast states (states bordering on the Atlantic Ocean), the
Justices have spent over half of their collective pre-Court lives in those
states.87 The Justices have spent a relatively short amount of time west
of the Mississippi and almost no time in the Southwest.88
The following charts show the geographic tendencies. First, Figure
13 shows the recent uptick of time spent in Washington, D.C.,89 with
Roberts 4 as a high point:
Figure 13: Geographic Tendencies

85. One thousand six hundred twenty-five collective years without Washington, D.C., and
2093 with D.C. included.
86. One thousand five hundred one collective years spent in the South.
87. The non-East Coast states that have the longest stays are Ohio, Kentucky, and
Tennessee.
88. Collectively, the Justices have spent more time living in foreign countries than in the
Southwest.
89. Note that the early ―0‖ years per Justice on the graph is a little deceiving since
Washington, D.C., did not become the capital until 1800.
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Figure 14 shows the time spent in New England and the MidAtlantic (not including D.C.) on one chart.90 Although the D.C. chart
shows some volatility, the remaining geographic charts fluctuate
significantly depending on the addition or subtraction of individual
Justices from the Court. For instance, the last three Justices appointed
(Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan) had all spent significant time in either
New York or New Jersey, so the Mid-Atlantic count spikes since 2006.
Likewise, the retirement of Justice Souter dented the New England
count, although the collective time spent at Yale and Harvard, plus
Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan‘s long New England experience, has
kept New England afloat. Here is New England and the Mid-Atlantic:
Figure 14: Years per Justice in New England and the Mid-Atlantic

Figure 15 shows the years each Justice spent in the South and the
Midwest. First, and unsurprisingly, there are no Midwest years until the
appointment of Ohioan Justice John McLean in 1830. Second, one
should note the relative prevalence of southern Justices from 1789 until
1949.91 From 1949 to 1955, the Southerners Rutledge, Vinson, and
90. Because of the variability in the per Justice numbers, only two data sets are combined
on the next two charts. A chart with more than two data sets is very hard to read.
91. The years from 1946 to 1949 marked a modern highpoint for Southern geographic
experience with the replacement of Chief Justice Harlan Stone (who was primarily a New
Yorker and New Englander) with the Kentucky native Chief Justice Frederick Vinson. The other
Justices with Southern experience on the Vinson 1 and Vinson 2 Courts were Alabama native
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Jackson died in office and were replaced by non-southerners Minton,
Warren, and the second Justice Harlan; the South has been less
prevalent since.92
Figure 15: Years per Justice in the South and the Midwest

Hugo Black, Kentucky native Stanley Reed, and Wiley Rutledge, who grew up in the South.
Year 1949 saw Tom Clark replace the Midwesterner Frank Murphy. Justice Clark is not coded
as a southerner, but as the only Texan to serve on the Supreme Court, his years plus the years of
other Vinson 1 Justices created a relatively strong southern flavor to the Court. See
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 379, 435, 681, 725, 743, 780, 820; COMPENDIUM,
supra note 23, at 346.
92. Justice Sherman Minton had spent three years practicing in Miami from 1925 to 1928,
but spent the great bulk of his life in Indiana. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at
670. Neither Chief Justice Warren nor Justice Harlan had any Southern experience. The
prevalence of southern Justices in the post-Civil War period is surprising. As noted in Part I,
tying case results to non-ideological experiential factors has been challenging, but the
prevalence of southerners on the Court before the 1950s may help explain Plessy v. Ferguson
and the many other Court cases upholding Jim Crow and ―separate but equal‖ laws. It is worth
noting, however, that the first, tentative steps in dismantling segregation were taken under the
late Stone and early Vinson Courts, which were relatively southern. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt,
Brown‘s Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483, 1486 (1994) (arguing that ―in a series of cases
involving such matters as voting rights, interstate transportation, and graduate school
education,‖ from 1944 to 1954 ―the Court gave clear indications that it disapproved of Southern
segregation practices‖).
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Figure 16 displays the remaining categories: years per Justice in the
Southwest, West, and foreign countries. The foreign line is highest
during the periods where Justices had grown up in a foreign country.
The five-Justice, no Chief Justice group from 1796, and the six-Justice
Jay 2 Court of 1790 to 1792 are the two Courts with the most foreign
experience. Justices James Wilson, William Paterson, and James Iredell
were born overseas, and Justices John Jay, John Blair, and John
Rutledge each spent a short period overseas working or studying law.93
While the time spent abroad by the Justices has lessened over time, it is
noteworthy that at least one Justice has had at least one year overseas
for the great majority of the Court‘s existence. In contrast, western
Justices were unknown until the appointment of the Californian Stephen
Field in 1863,94 and the Southwest does not appear until Justice Wiley
Rutledge‘s appointment in 1943.95
Figure 16: Years per Justice in the Southwest, the West, and Foreign
Countries

93. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 382, 576, 580, 702, 743, 848.
94. Justice Field was born in Connecticut and raised mostly in Massachusetts, but spent
the bulk of his adult life and career in California. See id. at 494. California had only been a state
for thirteen years when President Abraham Lincoln appointed Field.
95. Justice Rutledge spent three years of young adulthood in New Mexico, see JOHN M.
FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY
RUTLEDGE 35–39 (2004), and six years in Colorado attending law school, practicing law, and
beginning his career as a legal academic. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 743.
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The three most prevalent geographic areas on the Roberts 4 Court
are the Mid-Atlantic, Washington, D.C., and the West, although all of
the Justices have spent at least a few years in New England—the only
such region on the current Court. Roberts 4 shows increases in
Washington, D.C., and Mid-Atlantic and a decline in the other areas.
The most notable feature of the Roberts 4 Court is the time the Justices
spent working in Washington, D.C., where the current Court represents
a high-water mark.
K. Education
The Justices‘ educational experiences mirror larger changes in the
educational paths of lawyers in America. For instance, every Justice
appointed from 1789 to 1899, except two, spent some period of years
―reading the law.‖96 From the twentieth century forward, this became
much less common. Likewise, eleven different nineteenth-century
Justices (and one twentieth century Justice) had no formal
undergraduate or graduate education whatsoever, just a period reading
law.97 Three twentieth-century Justices have only a law school
education and no undergraduate studies.98 Figure 17 illustrates the
relative years spent in undergraduate education, law school, and reading
the law per Justice:

96. There were fifty-eight Justices during this period (counting Justice Rutledge twice).
See DATABASE, supra note 23. The only two Justices who did not read the law were Justice John
Blair (1790–1796), who studied law at the Middle Temple in London (which could be coded as
reading the law, but was coded as law school) and Justice Benjamin Curtis (1851–1857), who
attended Harvard Law School. See id.; BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 382, 453.
The first Justice of the twentieth century, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, did not read the law
and attended Harvard Law School. See DATABASE, supra note 23; BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY,
supra note 22, at 559. In this and other ways, Justice Holmes was a sign of things to come in the
twentieth century.
97. The eleven from the nineteenth century are John Catron, Samuel Chase, Nathan
Clifford, Gabriel Duvall, James Iredell, John Marshall, John McKinley, John McLean, Alfred
Moore, Rufus Peckham, and Noah Swayne. See DATABASE, supra note 23; BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 425, 430, 439, 479, 576, 637, 655, 656, 674, 705, 786. Justice
James F. Byrnes is the lone twentieth-century example. Byrnes was, of course, a remarkable
man in most every respect. In the course of his career, he served as a U.S. Representative, a U.S.
Senator, the Governor of South Carolina, a Supreme Court Justice, Chairman of the U.S. War
Mobilization Board during World War II, and Secretary of State immediately following World
War II. See DATABASE, supra note 23; BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 412.
98. These are Justices Robert Jackson, Sherman Minton, and Charles Whittaker. See
DATABASE, supra note 23; BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 579, 670, 842.
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Figure 17: Years Spent in Undergraduate Education, Law School, and
Reading the Law per Justice

The current educational program of four years of undergraduate
education and three years of law school education per Justice is actually
of relatively recent vintage, as demonstrated by the Justices‘ various
educational routes to the Supreme Court over the years. The first year
when every Justice had four years of undergraduate work and three
years of law school was 1986, when Justice Scalia replaced Chief
Justice Burger.99
Nevertheless, recent Supreme Courts have not only completed more
formal legal education, their education has grown increasingly elite. For
example, a count of total years spent in undergraduate or law school
education at either Stanford or an Ivy League institution shows that the
Roberts 4 Court is first in this measure by a substantial margin with
fifty-five total years. Notably, this trend started in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. The first non-Roberts, Rehnquist, or Burger Court in
this ranking of elite education is the Hughes 5 Court (1938 to 1939)
with twenty-eight years of combined elite education.
Figure 18 separates out elite undergraduate and law school
educations. It demonstrates graphically the rise of elite undergraduate
education (counting Ivy League institutions and Stanford) and the Yale
and Harvard Law Schools.

99. Chief Justice Warren Burger spent three years getting a law degree at St. Paul College
of Law and two years as an undergraduate (without earning a degree). See BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY, supra note 22, at 407.
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Figure 18: Years Spent in Elite Undergraduate and Law School
Institutions

Although there is one other high point in the early nineteenth century
for elite undergraduate education,100 the Roberts 4 Court is far and away
the first in time spent at the most elite American undergraduate
institutions and law schools.
L. Summary
The Roberts 4 Court is the apogee of a number of Supreme Court
selection trends. Counting Justice backgrounds by the number of years
each Justice spent on an activity or in a geographic location leads to a
rather startling picture of the current Supreme Court. The Roberts 4
Court has spent less time in private practice than any previous Supreme
Court. The Justices of the Roberts 4 Court have spent almost as much
time as government lawyers as they have in the private practice of law,
another first for any Court.101 The Justices of Roberts 2, 3, and 4 have
the least collective experience in elected office and are the first Courts
to lack any Justice with experience as an elected official. The Roberts
Courts are also on the low end of trial judging experience.
100. The Taney 1 Court (1836) featured Harvard alumnus Justice Joseph Story, Princeton
(then called the College of New Jersey) alumni Justices Smith Thompson and James Wayne,
and Yale almnus Justice Henry Baldwin. See id. at 362, 782, 804, 834. Of the other two justices,
Chief Justice Roger Taney attended Dickinson University and Justice John McLean did not
attend an undergraduate institution but read law. See id. at 656, 795; DATABASE, supra note 23.
101. This additional government experience means that the Roberts Court does not have
the least time practicing law of any Court. See supra Figure 5.
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Much of this lost experiential time can be attributed to time spent in
legal academia. The Justices of the Roberts 4 Court have spent more
time in legal academia than the Justices on any other Supreme Court,
although two Courts of the 1940s are close.
Much of the rest of their time has been spent in appellate judging.
Roberts 2 and 3 are the two Supreme Courts with the most time spent in
appellate judging. Roberts 2 and 3 are not first in total years of judging,
however; the combination of trial and appellate judging on some
previous Courts has been higher.
Partially because of all of the combined years on the D.C. Circuit
and in government lawyering, the Roberts 4 Court has spent more years
in Washington, D.C., than any other Supreme Court. Lastly, the
Roberts 4 Court has spent more time in elite undergraduate institutions
and law schools than any other Court.
Thus, the trends toward law teaching and appellate judging—and
away from the private practice of law, elected office, and serving as a
trial judge—have all reached peaks or valleys in the Roberts Courts.
These trends are empirically demonstrable and undeniable. The harder
question is whether they are healthy or harmful, a question to which we
next turn.
III. A NORMATIVE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ELITE MAKE-UP OF THE
CURRENT COURT
This Part builds on the empirical analysis to make a normative case
that the collective past experiences of the current Court are not optimal
given what the Court actually does. The arguments in this Part are not
empirical and many can, and will, disagree with my conclusions. At
heart, the question of whether the changes in Justices‘ backgrounds
have been good or bad likely depends on one‘s view of the quality of
the work of the current Court as well as one‘s impression of the current
Court‘s brand of elitism and meritocracy. Those questions do not lend
themselves to empirical answers.
Nevertheless, it is demonstrable that the Justices themselves come
from different backgrounds and that the current Court is operating
differently than previous Courts. The final conclusion—that these two
phenomena are related and regrettable—requires some additional
persuasion. Section III.A. discusses the collective backgrounds of the
current Justices and argues that they are a uniquely elite and cloistered
group of Justices. Section III.B. describes the role of the current Court
and argues that it is now largely a policy-making body, not a court of
appeals correcting errors and applying narrow legal principles. Section
III.C. argues that the role of the Court and the nature of the Justices are
heading in opposite directions: A policy making Court needs Justices
with real-life experience, individuals who have faced the hurly burly of
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legal practice, politics, or trial court judging to understand the
ramifications of broad social policy. Individuals with more varied life
experience may also be less likely to revert to complex legalism in
deciding cases and writing opinions, which is a serious problem with
the current Court.
A. The New Judicial Elite—Cloistered and Detached
It is empirically demonstrable that the background experiences of
Supreme Court Justices have changed over time and that the current
group of Supreme Court Justices is relatively unique. This Section
argues that the current Court exemplifies a certain way of thinking
about judicial meritocracy and elitism.
First, consider the more prevalent experiences on the Roberts 4
Court—these Justices have spent more time in cloistered and detached
work settings than any previous group of Justices. Cloistered and
detached means settings where a lawyer is kept above the fray and
encouraged to think about legal problems (and life) in the abstract.
These Justices have spent more time in appellate judging and legal
academia than prior Justices. These jobs share much in common. Both
jobs are notoriously and proudly independent.102 Both jobs deal with
law in an abstract manner.103 Neither job involves much contact with
the public at large. Both law professors and appellate judges tend to
encounter litigants on the written page—judges in the fact sections of
briefs and professors in the facts of the cases they teach. Both jobs are
closely associated with law students or recent law school graduates (in
their roles as judicial law clerks).
Both jobs are very hard to get and require a high level of technical
excellence in legal reasoning. I have written elsewhere about how
judges and Justices are often selected based upon their mastery of legal
analysis and complexity,104 and the emphasis placed upon analytical
legal reasoning is even higher in the law professoriate.105
102. Compare, Scott H. Bice, Foreword, Judicial Independence and Accountability
Symposium, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 311 (1999) (discussing judicial independence), with MARY ANN
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 208 (1996) (discussing the legal academic's distaste for
―advocacy scholarship‖).
103. Consider Judge John Noonan‘s excellent comparison between the professions on this
point. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Hercules and the Snail Darter, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1986, § 7,
at 12.
104. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
259–83 (2011).
105. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need
for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429, 432–37 (1986) (examining how the traditional
hiring criteria for law professors impact minorities); Leland Ware, People of Color in the
Academy: Patterns of Discrimination in Faculty Hiring and Retention, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD
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Perhaps, unsurprisingly, given their work post-law school, the
Roberts 4 Justices are particularly academically well-credentialed. No
Supreme Court has spent more time studying at the top American
educational institutions (Ivy League or Stanford for undergrad and
Harvard or Yale for law school). These experiences reflect a particular
type of achievement and another heavy dose of the ivory tower.
Furthermore, the Roberts 4 Court has spent more time living in
Washington, D.C., than any previous Court. This shows a deep
involvement with both the federal government and the Supreme Court
before becoming Justices. Insofar as there is an ―inside-the-Beltway‖
mentality,106 the Roberts 4 Court would be likely reflect to it.
The Roberts 4 Justices also probably know more about the
workings, output, and nature of the Supreme Court than any other group
of Justices. Many of the Justices have spent a lifetime studying the
Court as law professors, working at the Court as clerks, or practicing
before the Court as lawyers.107
Consider what experiences are missing. This Court is historically
short in three previously well-represented categories of experience: the
private practice of law, service as an elected politician, and trial
judging. The time these Justices have spent in the practice of law,
moreover, is clustered in appellate work or highly politicized work in
the White House Counsel‘s Office or for Congress, with little time spent
in the more traditional litigation or transactional practices of law.108
Thus, the experiences of the Roberts Court Justices evince a focus
on high-level legal reasoning, experience in appellate judging,
experience in jobs that are especially independent and ―neutral,‖ and a
special hybrid of meritocracy and elitism. These Justices have less
experience with the operation of the legal system below the theoretical
and appellate levels and less ―real-life‖ experiences of the give and take
of conflict, advocacy, and compromise.
B. What the Court Does—The Supreme Court is a Political Court
The Court has naturally transformed from its inception to the
present, but recent years have marked a particularly substantial change.
Over time, the Court‘s caseload has fallen109 while the size of its
L.J. 55, 61–62 (2000) (describing the traditional hiring criteria for law professors).
106. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Five Inconceivable Reasons to Support the Electoral
College, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 20, 22 (2007), available at
http://www.pennumbra.com
/debates/pdfs/electoral_college.pdf (decrying the ―inside-the-Beltway‖ mentality).
107. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
109. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Court‘s caseload hovered around 170 cases per term.
Since the 1990s, that number has settled to around ninety cases per term. See Margaret
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potential certiorari pool has grown.110 This means that the Court is
deciding fewer cases both as an absolute number and as a percentage of
petitions. As a consequence, the Court limits itself to cases of national
impact—cases where it can announce broad rules or decide critical
constitutional issues.111 While the overall percentage of constitutional
cases in the Court‘s docket has not risen,112 the salience of those
decisions (and the public backlash) certainly has grown since the
1950s.113
The Supreme Court makes politically freighted decisions at every
level of case review. The decision to rarely grant review itself is
politically loaded. The Court has essentially limited its own power by
choosing to address fewer cases. Commentators have speculated about
the reasons behind this, ranging from a desire ―to reduce the role of the
judiciary in the nation‘s political life,‖114 changes in the Court‘s
mandatory jurisdiction,115 the power of the Court‘s clerks in the
process,116 advanced age,117 to sloth.118 Professor Arthur Hellman has
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme
Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2010). For one explanation why, see Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 737, 750–93 (2001).
110. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 269–70 (2008). For a description of the
collapse in the number of certiorari petitions granted as an absolute and relative number, see
Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard
Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368–69 (2006), and Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme
Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 729 & n.9 (2001).
111. The Court‘s own Rule 10 suggests that certiorari will be granted only for ―compelling
reasons,‖ based upon an ―important federal question‖ or ―important matter‖ that has divided
federal courts of appeals, divided federal and state courts, and has not been decided by the
Supreme Court. SUP. CT. R. 10.
112. See Richard A. Posner, Foreword, A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 37–39 &
fig.1 (2005).
113. See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess:
Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 589–91 (2009)
(examining the Court‘s increasingly controversial constitutional decisions).
114. David O. Stewart, Quiet Times: The Supreme Court is Reducing its Workload—But
Why?, 80 A.B.A. J. 40, 43 (1994).
115. In 1988, Congress eliminated mandatory appeals from state supreme courts as well as
appeals from any courts that invalidate state statutes. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352,
102 Stat. 662 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254, 1257–1258 (2012)); see also
David M. O‘Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court’s
Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 781–82 (1997).
116. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Clerks Avoid Getting Their DIGs In: They Just Say
No to Cert Petitions, as the Court’s Docket Shrinks, 93 A.B.A. J. 12 (2007).
117. See, e.g., Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Age and Tenure of the Justices and Productivity of
the U.S. Supreme Court: Are Term Limits Necessary?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 161, 166–68
(2006).
118. See, e.g., Kevin Fayle, Supreme Slackers?, FINDLAW BLOG (Sept. 28, 2009, 1:24 PM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/courtside/2009/09/supreme-slackers.html.
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concluded that the Court‘s shrunken docket reflects an ―Olympian‖
Court that issues fewer, but more monumental, decisions.119
Once the Court chooses its cases, the decisions themselves will have
political consequences, and there is ample empirical and scholarly
evidence that politics plays a role in the Court‘s selections.120 The actual
process of writing and disseminating the opinions also depends on the
salience of the issue at hand, with higher profile cases drawing longer,
more complex opinions and more dissents and concurrences.121
The last sixty years have also seen a change in the public perception
of the Court‘s nature and role122 and increased attention to issues of
Justice selection and confirmation.123 Controversy and interest in the
selection of Justices are also at all-time highs.124
The combination of these factors means that if the Supreme Court
has not always been a political, policy-making body, it is now. Judge
Richard Posner has led a chorus of current scholarship proclaiming the
current Court a ―superlegislature‖ that sits chiefly to proclaim broad
new law governing categories of new cases, rather than a more
traditional appellate court that aims to create uniformity and correct
errors.125 Political scientists have likewise argued that the current
119. Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
403, 433 (1996).
120. The empirical evidence has frequently come from political scientists under the rubric
of the ―attitudinal model.‖ See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (using the attitudinal model to explain
and predict Supreme Court decision making). Scholarly evidence has come from all directions.
Consider, for example, the negative reaction to two very different cases: Roe v. Wade and Bush
v. Gore. See Dan M. Kahan, Foreword, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2, 13–16 (2011) (discussing the reaction to
Roe); see also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407, 1409 (2001) (suggesting that Bush v. Gore appeared to be motivated by the
―‗low‘ politics of partisan political advantage‖).
121. See Posner, A Political Court, supra note 112, at 38–39 (―Last Term [2004], 80% of
the Court‘s primarily constitutional decisions were by split vote, compared to 63% of its other
decisions, and a split decision is more likely to attract attention than a unanimous one, in part by
generating more—and more contentious—opinions in the case. Although only 38% of all the
Court‘s cases were primarily constitutional, 44% of all opinions (including concurrences and
dissents) were issued in such cases.‖).
122. See Carolyn Dineen King, Challenges to Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law:
A Perspective from the Circuit Courts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 773–74 (2007).
123. See RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
PROCESS 4–5 (2005).
124. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 381, 449–54 & fig.40 (2010).
125. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 110, at 323; Posner, A Political Court, supra
note 112, at 34; see also Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A
Question of Law or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 99–101 (2010), available at http://yalel
awjournal.org/images/pdfs/842.pdf (recognizing the Court as a ―cert court‖). For an outstanding
description of previous thinking about how judges are naturally political in deciding unclear
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Supreme Court has ―virtually untrammeled policymaking authority.‖126
C. Do These Justices Fit this Court?
The remaining question is whether these Justices are a good fit for
this Court. Supporters of this Court can argue that it is the most
qualified of any Court in history; they have spent more time considering
and studying constitutional theory and the Court itself than any other
group of Justices. Moreover, one person‘s elitism is another person‘s
highly functioning meritocracy—the current Court arguably evinces a
healthy desire to have the best of the very best serve in government and
to have the finest legal minds work on the Court.
Lastly, supporters might argue that the Court itself naturally tends to
be an elitist and anti-democratic body.127 It is thus self-defeating to
argue that ―ordinary people‖ who have ―real-life experience‖ should
staff the Court. Given the institutional design, the best practice is to find
the very best and most able Justices possible to serve critically
important life tenures.
It is somewhat counterintuitive to suggest that a group of Justices
that have spent significant chunks of their pre-Supreme Court lives
working in comparatively elite, detached, cloistered, and independent
settings are a bad fit for a policy making Court. Perhaps Justices who
have had extensive experience as appellate judges and law professors
and who are well versed in abstract thinking on constitutional issues are
especially well suited to a life on the Court. Further, given the long-term
changes in the nature, approach, and salience of the Court, it makes
sense that presidential appointments would drift towards candidates
with unimpeachable backgrounds and a history as a judge as a proxy for
future performance.128
Nevertheless, this Section argues that this trend is exactly
backwards: As the Court begins to more closely resemble a policy
making, ―Olympian‖ body, it is especially important to appoint
individuals with real-life experiences. This is because the current
Supreme Court makes many decisions that are not strictly ―legal‖ at all,
so technical legal expertise and excellence is not particularly useful. In
some cases it is actually harmful. This Section first considers the
experiences these Justices do have and argues that they lead inevitably
cases, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 685, 713–23 (2009).
126. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 120, at 12 (2002); see also id. at 26 (characterizing the
perception of judges as ―objective, dispassionate, and impartial‖ as the ―mythology of judging‖).
127. A particularly famous version of this argument considers the Supreme Court‘s
―countermajoritarian difficulty.‖ See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962).
128. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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and unfortunately to increased legal complexity. The Section then turns
to the Justices‘ missing experiences and argues that complicated,
diverse work with real people (through politics, lawyering, and trial
judging) has advantages in deciding cases and regulating the federal
courts. Lastly, ―real-life‖ experience is a key ingredient in the
development of practical wisdom, perhaps the most necessary of a
Justice‘s traits.
1. Complexity
Although long experience in writing judicial decisions or law review
articles may sharpen analytical reasoning, immersion and excellence in
that style of writing and reasoning in constitutional cases frequently
leads to obfuscation rather than clarification. Evidence abounds that the
Court‘s output has grown less accessible and more complex from the
Court‘s beginning to the present.129 Consider the opinions themselves.
Majority opinions have grown substantially longer.130 The prevalence of
dissenting and concurring opinions has grown drastically as well.131 The
most confusing and complex type of decision—those decided by a
plurality rather than a majority—has also become more common.132
Empirical and doctrinal legal scholarship further suggests increased
complexity in the Court‘s output.133 Professor Laura Little‘s empirical
study of the Supreme Court‘s obfuscating use of linguistic devices
found ―increased splintering‖ within the decisions and ―increased
opinion length and complexity.‖134 Describing the opinions of the 1980s
and
1990s,
Professor
Joseph
Goldstein
argued
that
―even . . . professional interpreters‖ would struggle ―to unravel what the
Court has to say, often at great length in heavily footnoted multiple
129. Of course, correlation does not prove causation. This Subsection is not arguing that
the current selection criteria have necessarily increased complexity. Instead, this Subsection
argues that Justices predisposed to complexity are less likely to reverse the recent trend towards
complexity.
130. See Black & Spriggs, supra note 2, at 632–38.
131. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 221–27 (7th ed. 1998) (noting the trend
away from unanimous opinions and towards increased use of dissents and concurrences).
132. See Spriggs & Stras, supra note 3, at 519 (―Historically, plurality decisions by the
Supreme Court have been relatively rare . . . . [T]he frequency of plurality opinions dramatically
increased in the 1940s and 1950s, the occurrence of plurality opinions between 1953 and 2006
has remained fairly steady, with a moderate increase during the 1970s when Warren Burger
served as Chief Justice.‖); see also Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the
―Respectful‖ Dissent, supra note 3, at 1306–26 (discussing the growth in the dissenting opinion
and the word ―respectfully‖).
133. The best empirical study of Supreme Court complexity is Ryan J. Owens & Justin
Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court
Opinions, 45 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 1027 (2011).
134. Little, Hiding with Words, supra note 4, at 126–27.
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opinions.‖135 Robert Nagel described the writing as ―formalized‖ and
characterized by ―elaborately layered sets of ‗tests‘ or ‗prongs‘ or
‗requirements‘ or ‗standards‘ or ‗hurdles‘ . . . [and] standing amidst a
welter of separate opinions and contentious footnotes.‖136
Commentators have criticized the Court‘s treatment of conflict of laws
and federal jurisdiction as complex and incoherent.137 Complexity and
nuance have also led to ―stealth overruling‖—situations where the Court
discards a disfavored precedent piece by piece, rather than by clearly
overruling it.138
An easy proxy for the growth in legal complexity is lawyers and
case law. Over the past forty years, the number of lawyers per capita,
the amount spent on lawyers, and the numbers and pages of reported
judicial decisions have all spiked.139 Legal complexity is quite costly.
The most obvious harm is increased transaction and compliance
costs,140 but it also can contribute to crises like the recent financial
meltdown141 and the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.142
If concern about legal complexity is valid, this group of Justices
seems particularly ill situated to reverse the trend. Insofar as the current
135. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT‘S
OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND
17 (1992).
136. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 165 (1985); see
also Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 98 (1993) (decrying the Court‘s creation of a ―thick
undergrowth of technicality‖ and its development of multipronged tests ―everywhere and for
everything‖).
137. See, e.g., Louise Ellen Teitz, Complexity and Aggregation in Choice of Law: An
Introduction to the Landscape, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2009); see also Laura E.
Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formalism, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 925 (2004); Little, Hiding with Words, supra note 4.
138. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention
to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010).
139. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 3–7 (1995).
140. See BARTON, supra note 104, at 261–62; Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for
Low-Income Taxpayers: Some Options, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 172 (1996) (―Complexity is a
major problem for the federal tax system. Complexity erodes voluntary compliance with the tax
laws, creates a perception of unfairness for the system, impedes the effective administration of
the tax laws, results in high compliance costs, and interferes with economic transactions.‖).
141. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity,
Causation, Law, and Judgment, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299, 300–05, 343–50 (2010)
(analyzing how complexity played a role in the financial crisis); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009) (citing complexity as the
primary cause of the financial crisis and the greatest challenge financial markets face in the
future).
142. Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1099–1115 (2011) (identifying four major challenges complexity
produced in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill).
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group of Justices can take their jurisprudence of standing143 or the
Establishment Clause144 seriously (to use two particularly egregious
examples), it is a sign that we are placing too much stock in technical
excellence and too little in common sense. Finding the smartest people
to try to untangle the thorniest problems does not necessarily result in
elegant solutions. To the contrary, it may result in overthinking,
overwriting, and more complexity. This trend is especially discouraging
in the cases of highest salience; the Court decides cases that have a
massive effect on the country as a whole in opinions that few can read
and understand.
2. The Benefits of the Practice of Law, Political Experience, and Trial
Judging
Experiences practicing law and serving as a politician have three
notable common benefits. First, in each profession one is directly
answerable to third parties—either clients or voters. One serves in a
clear master–servant relationship as the servant. This relationship has
powerful psychological effects.145 Successful politicians and lawyers
frequently have to suppress their own natural preferences to follow the
will of the public or their clients. Politicians and lawyers are certainly
both likely to be advocates, but they must temper their advocacy to their
audiences and sometimes must work outside of their own preferences.
These acts of self-control and self-denial can prove helpful for a Justice
when his preferences clash with what he sees as the correct legal
decision. Appellate judges and law professors, in contrast, are instructed
to be neutral and ignore the preferences of outsiders.
Second, politicians and practicing lawyers operate in busy and
complicated real-life situations. They cannot operate in a detached or
143. Standing is notoriously indeterminate and results-oriented. Standing cases have been
called ―notoriously inconsistent,‖ Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S.
587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring), a ―jumbled mess,‖ John A. Ferejohn & Larry D.
Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1010 (2002), ―a quagmire,‖ Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing?:
Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 389 (2006), and a
―chaotic collection of rules and standards,‖ Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 612, 671 (2004). I have called standing an example of indeterminate complexity,
cumbersome, and hard to predict. BARTON, supra note 104, at 278–83. There may be Court
doctrines that are clear and law-based, but standing is not one of them.
144. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment
Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) (―It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme
Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess—both hopelessly confused and deeply
contradictory.‖).
145. William O. Fisher, Lawyers Keep Out: Why Attorneys Should Not Participate in
Negotiating Critical Financial Numbers Reported by Public Company Clients, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 1501, 1545–46 (discussing the ―ethos of legal practice‖ and the ―psychological effects of
the lawyer-client relationship‖).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 1

1180

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

cloistered fashion; they must get elected, find clients, and make legal or
political arguments. Politicians and trial lawyers must also make their
arguments in a manner that ordinary people (voters or jurors) can
understand. Both jobs encourage the translation of the complicated into
the plain, a key (and frequently missing) talent on the Court.
Lastly, politicians and lawyers frequently must compromise or
settle. There is a reason why politics is compared to making sausage—it
is a messy business that requires give and take from all parties
involved.146 Likewise, much of lawyering involves negotiation, settling,
and deal making.147
The lack of trial judging in addition to the loss of trial lawyering is
also notable. Trial judges are required to make actual decisions about
the people who appear before them, so although they are neutral, they
are not cloistered. The mere act of sentencing defendants or witnessing
jury verdicts means that trial judges see the effects of their work daily.
Moreover, trial judges have a particularly crucial experience with the
American justice system: They work with juries. In a time of expanded
judicial power, the Court has been notably suspicious of juries.148
3. Regulators
The Supreme Court is at the head of the process for drafting the
Federal Rules of Procedure, Evidence, Criminal Procedure, Bankruptcy,
Appellate Procedure, and Admiralty.149 The Supreme Court has been at
the head of the process of drafting and amending the Federal Rules of

146. Among the recent examples of former politician Justices known for their ability to
compromise and generate consensus are Chief Justice Warren, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA‘S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY 695–99 (1976) (discussing Warren‘s dexterous use of power and compromise in
Brown) and Justice O‘Connor. See Keith J. Bybee, The Jurisprudence of Uncertainty, 35 LAW &
SOC‘Y REV. 943, 943–44 (2001) (describing O‘Connor as the ―swing‖ vote on the Court, who
follows ―a path of compromise and accommodation‖).
147. See generally JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: HOW SETTLEMENT IS
TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2008).
148. Consider the Court‘s refusal to require a jury in trials for petty crimes. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156–58 (1968) (refusing to require a jury trial for crimes punishable by
less than six months in jail and acknowledging the argument of critics who question ―the
wisdom of permitting untrained laymen to determine the facts in civil and criminal
proceedings‖). The Court‘s cases on preemption of state tort actions likewise evince hostility
toward juries. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (―Indeed, one would
think that tort law, applied by juries . . . is less deserving of preservation‖ because ―a
jury . . . sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its
benefits . . . .‖).
149. For an overview of these powers and their historical development, see generally PAUL
M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
749–65 (3d. ed. 1988).
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Civil Procedure since the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. 150
The Supreme Court leads the drafting and amending of the rules,
although Congress retained the power to revise or reject their proposals.
Unless proposed rules are rejected, modified, or deferred, they
automatically become law provided that Congress has had at least seven
months to consider them.151 While the Court has ceded some of its
rulemaking responsibility to the Judicial Conference,152 the Justices are
still key players in the process.153
Similarly, the Court is also the last word in the interpretation of
those Rules. A pair of recent decisions—Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly154 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal155—displays the broad contours of
this power. The Court held that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) requires plaintiffs to present a ―plausible‖ claim for
relief in the complaint,156 a significant tightening in pleading
standards.157 The text of Rule 8 requires only a ―short and plain‖
150. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072) (2012);
see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982)
(examining the Act‘s history and how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Act); Jack H.
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 673, 673 (1975).
151. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2074, 2075 (2012); see also Paul D. Carrington,
Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 300
(1994).
152. The current process begins with five advisory committees dealing respectively with
the appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evidence rules. Any proposed changes to these
rules is hashed out by an advisory committee, published for public comment, then reconsidered
by the advisory committee before approval by the Standing Committee of the Judicial
Conference, the Judicial Conference itself, the Supreme Court, and lastly Congress. For a full
overview of the process, see Thomas F. Hogan, The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure:
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/Rul
esAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx.
153. ―The Chief Justice of the United States is the presiding officer of the Judicial
Conference.‖ U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MEMBERSHIP,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Membership.aspx (last
visited June 15, 2012). The Chief Justice also appoints the members of the pertinent committees.
See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and
the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1619–20 (2006).
The Court has the last vote on any rule changes before submission to Congress. See Hogan,
supra note 152. Because Congress regularly chooses not to act on the rules, the Court is
frequently the last step in the rulemaking process. See Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for
Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 78 (2010) (―As a
practical matter, Congress involves itself in the [rulemaking] process only infrequently.‖).
154. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
155. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
156. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
157. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems,
95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823–32 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–53 (2010).
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statement of facts and claims and has done so since its inception.158
Given the Court‘s central role in these critical functions, a clear
understanding of how these Rules play out in practice would be helpful.
Nevertheless, between the loss of time as trial judges and in the private
practice of law, the Roberts Court Justices have less perspective than
ever.
Commentators have pilloried Iqbal and Twombly, noting that these
cases evince hostility to, and ignorance of, litigation practice.159
Correlation does not equal causation, but the Supreme Court‘s recent
trend away from Justices with lawyering experience greatly accelerated
in the 1980s, and the recent collapse in the number of federal court
trials, began almost contemporaneously.160
4. Practical Wisdom and Virtue Ethics
Consider the connection between life experience and ―practical
wisdom.‖ Practical wisdom has been praised as a judicial characteristic
in both the Aristotelian manner161 and less formally as a synonym for
common sense.162 Under its formal or informal descriptions, however,
158. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, There’s a Pennoyer in My Foyer: Civil Procedure
According to Dr. Seuss, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 105, 115 (2009) (noting that ―the old [Rule 8] hasn‘t
been amended in the least‖ but the Court‘s interpretation changed nonetheless).
159. See Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951, 967 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide
Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 200 (2010). For other notable
critiques, see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 867–78 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal extended
Twombly in a dangerous direction); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1919, 1932–34 (2009) (noting the Court‘s empirical weakness in Twombly, acting
―with no empirical support that a problem existed, and with no exploration of the dimensions of
that problem or the efficacy of the Court‘s newfangled cure‖); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (decrying the burden that the
new pleading standard imposes on civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 460–86 (2008) (asserting that
new standard will weed out otherwise meritorious claims); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary
Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 15 (2010) (stating that the Court has moved the summary judgment inquiry to the pleading
stage).
160. Compare supra Figure 2 (showing a decline in practice experience beginning in the
1980s), with Michael Orey, The Vanishing Trial, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 30, 2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_18/b4032047.htm (―After peaking at
12,018 in 1984, the number of civil trials in all federal district courts has dropped precipitously,
reaching a new low of 3,555 last year. That‘s almost half the number of federal trials that took
place 40 years ago, even though the number of suits filed during the same period soared from
66,144 to 259,541.‖).
161. Edward C. Lyons, Reason’s Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty, 55 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 157, 228–31 (2007).
162. Justice O‘Connor has been praised for exactly this virtue. See Jane E. Stromseth, The
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experience creates, shapes, and guides practical wisdom.
Virtue ethics places practical wisdom at the very heart of proper
decision making. In short, moral philosophy can be roughly separated
into three categories: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.
These categories overlap and there is not always agreement that they are
separate at all.163 Consequentialism judges a moral act by its
consequences. Utilitarianism is thus a form of consequentialism.164
Deontology judges a moral act according to an external set of rules,
regardless of its consequences. Kant‘s moral imperative is an example
of a deontological alternative to utilitarianism.165
Virtue ethics, in comparison, focuses on the character of the actor.
Modern virtue ethicists work from Aristotle‘s vision of virtue as the key
to moral decision making.166 Virtue ethics are seen as a ―third way‖
around the eternal battle between the consequentialists and the
deontologists.167 This is because virtue ethics allows one to judge an act
based on the character of the actor, rather than on the act‘s results or by
measuring the act against a rigid, external set of rules.168
Professor Lawrence Solum has been in the forefront of applying
virtue ethics to the law as ―virtue jurisprudence.‖169 He has argued for
an ―aretaic turn‖ in the selection of Justices, away from their perceived
politics and towards a broad examination of their virtues, especially
Aristotle‘s conception of practical wisdom or phronesis.170 He likewise
International Criminal Court and Justice on the Ground, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 427, 427 (2011); see
also Scott Bales, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: No Insurmountable Hurdles, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1705, 1711 (2006). Also, consider Justice Jackson‘s famous take on practical wisdom and the
Constitution: ―There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little
practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.‖
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). For a most interesting
series of biographical notes on Justice Jackson, see John Q. Barrett, The Jackson List, available
at http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/faculty/profiles/Barrett/JacksonList.sju.
163. See, e.g., Marcia Baron, Virtue Ethics in Relation to Kantian Ethics: An Opinionated
Overview and Commentary, in PERFECTING VIRTUE: NEW ESSAYS ON KANTIAN ETHICS AND
VIRTUE ETHICS 18–21 (Lawrence Jost & Julian Wuerth eds., 2011).
164. See, e.g., John L. Watts, Fairness and Utility in Products Liability: Balancing
Individual Rights and Social Welfare, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 596, 597–98 (2011).
165. See Peter A. Alces, Contract is Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 907–08
(2010).
166. One of the first modern statements of virtue ethics was G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern
Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958).
167. See Christopher Miles Coope, Modern Virtue Ethics, in VALUE AND VIRTUES:
ARISTOTELIANISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 37–38 (Timothy Chappell ed., 2006).
168. For a prominent recent version of this argument, see ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON
VIRTUE ETHICS (1999).
169. Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum,
Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003)
[hereinafter Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence].
170. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L.
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has criticized empirical efforts to ―rank‖ Justices because of their failure
to consider the importance of the essentially immeasurable virtue of
practical wisdom.171
Professor Solum‘s work is of a piece with other explanations of the
act of judging. Professor Anthony Kronman spends a large chunk of
The Lost Lawyer on practical wisdom172 and its role in good judging173
and lawyering.174 The idea that the act of judging is best described as a
craft fits this model as well.175 In sum, virtue jurisprudence argues that
the interaction between the character of the judge and the act of judging
is the key question, not the outcomes of the decision (consequentialism)
or the decision‘s compliance with any strict conception of justice
(deontology).176
Practical wisdom is at the heart of the virtue jurisprudence
project.177 It is thus important to consider what practical wisdom looks
like, how to recognize it, and how one fosters it. Book VI of Aristotle‘s
Nicomachean Ethics discusses four intellectual virtues: science, theory,
philosophy, and practical wisdom.178 Practical wisdom, or phronesis, is
REV. 475, 510–12 (2004–2005). For an early version of his thinking, see Lawrence B. Solum,
Comment, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988).
171. Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament Of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1387
(2005) (―Supreme Court Justices should be selected from among those who have demonstrated
their possession of practical wisdom, both from the bench and in wider public life.‖).
172. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 53–108 (1993); see also Anthony Kronman, Practical Wisdom and Professional
Character, in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 203, 208 (Jules Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1987).
173. See KRONMAN, supra note 172, at 315–52.
174. See id. at 109–62.
175. For a classic version of law as craft, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 213–35 (1960). For a more modern overview, see Brett G.
Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2274–2322 (2001).
176. In recent American jurisprudence, law and economics is the most popular
consequentialist theory and John Rawls‘s concept of ―justice as fairness‖ is among the leading
deontological approaches. Compare JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999), with
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (6th ed. 2003). Of course, not everyone
agrees that these categories are useful. See Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics is Moral, 24
VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 166 (1990) (―I do not derive my economic libertarian views from a
foundational moral philosophy such as the philosophy of Kant, or Locke‘s philosophy of natural
rights, or utilitarianism, or anything of that sort. I regard moral philosophy as a weak field, a
field in disarray, a field in which consensus is impossible to achieve in our society. I do not
think it provides a promising foundation for a philosophy of government.‖).
177. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, supra note 169, at 202 (―[T]he notion of a just
decision cannot be untangled from the notion of a virtuous judge grasping the salient features of
the case. Virtue, in particular the virtue of phronesis or judicial wisdom, is a central and
ineliminable part of the story.‖); Lawrence B. Solum, A Virtue-Centered Account of Equity and
the Rule of Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 142–62 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence Solum eds.,
2008).
178. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI (W.D. Ross trans., 1908), available at
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primarily ―concerned with things human and things about which it is
possible to deliberate;‖ deliberation about particulars is the heart of
phronesis.179 Practical wisdom is distinct from the other virtues because
it is not ―concerned with universals only—it must also recognize the
particulars.‖180 Animals can have practical wisdom, ―those [animals]
which are found to have a power of foresight with regard to their own
life.‖181
Professor Jeffrey Lipshaw has put it succinctly: Phronesis is ―the
ability to deliberate well, to deal with universal principles as well as
particular actions, to assess which actions are conducive to ends, to
employ sympathetic understanding in the effort to determine what is
fair, and to distinguish and abjure mere cleverness in the pursuit of a
bad end.‖182
Practical wisdom is not gained by cloistered study and
contemplation of the neutral principles of law; it is gained by living a
varied and challenging life.183 Aristotle argued that phronesis is
―practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. This is why some
who do not know, and especially those who have experience are more
practical than others who know.‖184
The trend in Justice selection criteria seems designed to emphasize
―those who know‖ over those with practical wisdom. Anthony Kronman
has noted that technical expertise in law without practical wisdom is at
the root of the American legal profession‘s existential crisis.185
Selecting Justices based upon their ―merit‖ rather than a fuller look at
their character or experiences will likewise prove self-defeating.
5. A Last Word on the Nature of Elite Competition
This is not to say that these Justices have not ploughed long and
hard roads to get where they are. To the contrary, Justices with these
résumés have worked relentlessly and tirelessly from their earliest ages
http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/Projects/digitexts/aristotle/nicomachean_ethics/book0
6.html.
179. Id. bk. VI, ch. 7.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward a
Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
183. See Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project, 9 CLINICAL L.
REV. 623, 678–79 (2003) (―Notions of practical wisdom and creative problem solving by their
very nature depend upon life experience.‖). Professor Mark Tushnet has similarly argued that
the best sign of a Justice‘s character is his or her experience. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional
Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REV. 747, 756–63 (1992).
184. ARISTOTLE, supra note 178, bk. VI, ch. 7.
185. See KRONMAN, supra note 172, at 109–62 (outlining several crucial problems that
arise when lawyers and judges lack practical wisdom).
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to be the very best of the best. They competed for admission to the best
universities and law schools. Three Justices received fellowships to
study in Europe.186 Three Justices served as clerks to Supreme Court
Justices.187 Five of the Justices taught at law schools, four of them at top
ten schools.188 Five of them held a high level law and policy job with
either the executive branch or the U.S. Senate. Three worked in the
Solicitor General‘s Office and four had argued cases before the
Supreme Court before becoming Justices.189 Eight of the Justices were
able to secure jobs as federal appellate judges.190 In sum, at each level
of their professional careers, these Justices have competed against their
peers for accolades and jobs that were very, very difficult to obtain, and
won.
All the same, success in these competitions is a mixed bag. These
competitions encourage a particular kind of ―head down‖ focus on
achievement above all else. These career achievements certainly predict
an ability to work hard and push through difficult and complicated
tasks. They do not, however, tend to correlate very strongly with a sense
of perspective.
Each of these various achievements is quite academic. As argued
above, these achievements favor technical legal excellence and a
particular type of intelligence. It should not be surprising that these
Justices produce the types of opinions now common on the Court:
divided, over-written, and complex. In comparison, success in the
private practice of law or as a politician rewards a broader and different
set of skills.
Lastly, many of these achievements show a potentially overweening
desire to be on the Supreme Court. To paraphrase Plato and quote
Douglas Adams, ―it is a well-known fact that those people who must
186. Justices Kagan and Breyer also competed for, and received, scholarships to study at
Oxford University (Breyer a Marshall Scholarship and Kagan a Daniel M. Sachs Scholarship).
Justice Scalia received a Sheldon fellowship from Harvard for European travel and study.
187. Justice Breyer clerked for Justice Arthur Goldberg; Justice Roberts clerked for Justice
Rehnquist; and Justice Kagan clerked for Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Alito clerked for
Judge Leonard Garth on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, but not for a Justice on the Supreme
Court.
188. Justice Scalia taught at the University of Virginia, the University of Chicago, and
Stanford. Justice Ginsburg taught at Rutgers and Columbia. Justice Breyer taught at Harvard.
Justice Kagan taught at the University of Chicago and Harvard. Justice Kennedy taught at the
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
189. Justices Kagan, Alito, and Roberts worked in the Solicitor General‘s Office. Justice
Ginsburg argued several cases before the Supreme Court while working for the ACLU
Women‘s Rights Project.
190. Justice Kagan is the only non-appellate judge now on the Court. In 1999, President
Bill Clinton nominated Elena Kagan for a seat on the D.C. Circuit, but the Senate took no action
on her nomination. Instead, she spent the years before her nomination to the Supreme Court as
the Dean of Harvard Law School and as the Solicitor General of the United States.
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want to rule people are, ipso facto, those least suited to do it.‖191 By
comparison, it is quite unlikely that the politicians or lifelong lawyers
who became Justices were angling for Court appointment from the start
of their careers. Multiple prior Supreme Court Justices left the Court to
pursue other ambitions; it is hard to think of any of these Justices doing
the same.192
CONCLUSION
It is empirically demonstrable that the current Supreme Court
Justices have had different collective experiences than past Supreme
Court Justices. These experiences have clustered around particularly
elite experiences: time spent at Ivy League institutions and Stanford,
time spent working in high-end law or policy jobs for the government,
time spent in academia, time living in Washington, D.C., and time
serving as federal appellate judges. The Justices‘ lost experiences
include the private practice of law, elective office, and trial judging.
After establishing these trends, this Article has made a normative
case against them. The success of this argument likely rests upon one‘s
reaction to elitist meritocracy. If one thinks that lifetime Supreme Court
appointments should go to Justices who have displayed a particular kind
of technical legal excellence and a single-minded focus upon
achievement, then the current system is perfect.
If, on the other hand, we would prefer Justices with more real-life
experiences, a return to prior emphasis on the practice of law, trial
judging, and political experience would be welcome. This might also
ameliorate overly complex Supreme Court case law and provide the
Court with some needed practical wisdom.

191. See DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE RESTAURANT AT THE END OF THE UNIVERSE 197 (1995).
192. For example, Justice Charles Evan Hughes left the Court to become the Republican
candidate for President, engage in private practice, and serve as the Secretary of State (among
other activities), before returning to the Court as Chief Justice. See ROSS, supra note 43, at 8–12.
Chief Justice John Jay retired from the Court to serve two terms as the Governor of New York.
See THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800 7
(Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985).
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